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History bears out the genius of the Founding Fathers, who created a Government
subject to law but not left subject to inertia when vigor and initiative are required.
- Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 700 (1952).
I. INTRODUCTION
The debate over the extent of Presidential authority has been argued since the
very formation of our great nation. On September 17, 1787, in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, thirty-nine state delegates convened at the Constitutional Convention
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and signed the Constitution of the United States into law.1 At that time, the founding
fathers intended to create an effective central government with a wide range of
enforceable powers.2 The President of the United States was intended to be the chief
protector and the representative of the populace.3
The constitutional executive powers held by the President are broadly defined
and vary in application. Chief Justice Marshall once wrote that, while the
Constitution‘s ―means are adequate to its ends,‖ it is ―intended to endure for ages to
come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs‖4
Therefore, this Article addresses, chiefly, the extent of the President‘s Executive
powers to respond to threats to the security of the United States.‖ 5
According to the Court in In Re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890), ―[the President] is
enabled to fulfill the duty of his great department, expressed in the phrase that ‗he
shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.‘‖ 6 Specifically, the Framers
intended the President‘s constitutional authority to be ―a continuation of the English
and colonial tradition in war powers.‖7 In other words, the founders intended that,
aside from Congress, the President should have the primary responsibility along with
the necessary and requisite powers to protect the national security.8 The President is
not required to ―seek legislative permission before engaging the military,‖9 nor does
this create a limitation whereas the executive would ―have no power to commence
war, or conclude peace, or enter into a final treaty without legislative approval.‖ 10
The President must also have the latitude to act with ―decision, activity, secrecy,
and dispatch.‖11 This completely autonomous executive decision is sometimes
tempered by the constitutional principle of checks and balances, such as the
congressional and judicial oversight on executive authority, whether via legislation,
inherent powers, or vis-à-vis Presidential deference. Finally, this Article endeavors
to answer the profound question that continually faces this nation, in both past and
present crises: in an emergency scenario, whether it be a terrorist attack, health
crisis, or a natural environmental disaster, how broad, or rather, how substantive are
the President‘s enumerated emergency powers?
1
THE OXFORD COMPANION
(1966).
2

TO

UNITED STATES HISTORY 156 (Paul S. Boyer ed., 2001)

Id.

3

John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics By Other Means: The Original
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 174 (1996).
4

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 682 (1952).

5

See Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The President‟s Constitutional Authority to
Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations That Harbor or
Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 488, 489-90 (2002).
6

Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890).

7

Yoo, supra note 3, at 252.

8

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

9

Yoo, supra note 3, at 254.

10

Id. at 234.

11

Id. at 254.
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Hamilton said it best: ―the circumstances which may affect the public safety are
[not] reducible within certain determinate limits . . . there can be no limitation of that
authority which is to provide for the defense and protection of the community in any
matter essential to its efficacy.‖12 These varied occasions, such as martial law, posse
commitatus, or immediate response, as envisioned by the Framers, were considered
constitutional regardless of any limitations they placed on civil rights or liberties. 13
As long as the President followed his duty to faithfully execute the laws of the
United States and to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution, he operated
within his constitutional authority.
Within the perspective of Hamilton‘s admonition against limiting executive
authority, this Article endeavors to generally discuss the historical and recent
separation of powers issues arising with an active executive branch. Part II gives a
brief overview of executive powers and their limitations: first discussing what
actions are strictly executive in character, and then presenting Congress‘ attempts to
question the executive‘s emergency powers and addressing the Judicial branch‘s
struggle with finding a balance between judicial oversight and political question
doctrine. Part III reviews specifically enumerated powers of the executive in
emergencies where executive action is justified by the constitution, such as the
evolution of emergency executive powers during wartime, force majeure, and, later
on, public health emergencies. Posse commitatus, martial law, and immediate
response principles are also discussed at length in this vein. In Part IV, the public
health emergency section delves into the powers available to the executive, whether
it be the President under his federal constitutional authority or the Governor under
his State police powers—regardless of executive authority, how far may the
executive go without overstepping the bonds of liberty.
Ultimately, this Article posits that the broad grant of executive authority in
exigent circumstances is warranted. ―With no time for ex ante deliberation, and no
metric for ex post assessments, the executive‘s capacities for swift, vigorous, and
secretive action are at a premium.‖ 14 The executive must be ready, willing, and able
to act immediately following a national disaster such as a public health emergency
where quarantine or isolation principles require the immediate segregation of the
populace, presumably against their wishes. 15 In such a case, where the executive acts
in favor of the whole,16 he must not be unduly hindered by judicial review or
congressional authority. The constitutional powers of the executive are constantly
12
Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 488; THE FEDERALIST NO. 23 (Alexander Hamilton)
(emphasis added).
13
See D. A. Jeremy Telman, A Truism That Isn‟t True? The Tenth Amendment and
Executive War Power, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 135, 149 (2001).
14

Deborah N. Pearlstein, Form and Function in the National Security Constitution, 41
CONN. L. REV. 1549, 1565 (2009).
15
See GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS:
THE NEED FOR A PUBLIC HEALTH – NOT LAW ENFORCEMENT/NATIONAL SECURITY – APPROACH
11 (2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/privacy/pemic_report.pdf.
16

THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 300 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., 1902) (―The
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether
of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the definition of tyranny.‖).
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changing, and are certainly broader than those envisioned in the days of Hamilton
and Madison. The original constitutional authority reflected the concerns of the
eighteenth century and was not ―well adapted to current conditions.‖ 17
II. THE AXIS OVERSIGHT
A. Executive Commander in Chief Powers
The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength, and the power
of directing and employing the common strength forms a usual and essential part in
the definition of the executive authority.
- Alexander Hamilton18
The constitutional executive powers vested in the President provide him with the
ability to speedily act in the nation‘s interest. ―Decision, activity, secrecy, and
dispatch will generally characterise [sic] the proceedings of one man, in a much
more eminent degree, than the proceedings of any greater number.‖ 19 The President
is vested with these powers to maintain the common good on behalf of societal
interest.20
The Founders intended to create a government that was ―clothed with all the
powers requisite to [the] complete execution of its trust.‖ 21 Congress is granted wide
latitude in its authority over the military and the execution of the laws. 22 Article I,
Section 8 of the United States Constitution grants Congress the power to ―declare
war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land
and water.‖23 Congress may also raise, maintain, and provide support for the army 24
and navy,25 ―make [r]ules for the [g]overnment and [r]egulation of the land and
naval [f]orces,‖26 and may ―[call] forth the [m]ilitia to execute the [l]aws . . .
suppress insurrections and repel Invasions.‖27 Finally, Congress is entrusted with the
17

Pearlstein, supra note 14, at 1551 n.2 (quoting Eric A. Posner, et al., Terror in the
Balance: Security, Liberty, and the Courts 56, (2007)).
18

THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 463 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., 1902).

19

THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., 1902).

20

THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 436 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., 1902)
(―Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is
essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to
the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and
high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the
security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of
anarchy.‖).
21

The Federalist No. 23, at 137 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., 1902).

22

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Id.

26

Id.

27

Id.
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ability to organize, arm, and discipline the militia, and to ―make all [l]aws which
shall be necessary and proper‖ to execute these powers. 28 These military powers
provide Congress with control over undeclared, as well as declared, actions of war. 29
Conversely, Article II of the Constitution establishes the President as
―[c]ommander in [c]hief of the [a]rmy and [n]avy of the United States, and of the
[m]ilitia of the several [s]tates, when called into the actual [s]ervice of the United
States.‖30 Article II, Section 1, vests the ―executive power‖ with the President, and
requires that he faithfully execute the laws of the United States 31 and dictates that the
President must, to the best of his abilities, ―preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States.‖32
Article II, Section 2, entails the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President
with the power to be ―Commander in Chief of the [a]rmy and [n]avy of the United
States.‖33 This provides him with ―supreme command over the land and naval forces
of the country,‖34 and he may order the armed forces to perform any necessary
military duties as appropriate for the defense of the United States. 35 The President
may also ―dispose of troops and equipment in such manner and on such duties as
best to promote the safety of the country,‖36 and to ―effectuate the defense of the
United States.‖37 These specific powers accorded to the President exist both in times
of peace, as well as in times of war. 38
The President is also tasked to recommend to Congress consideration ―such
[m]easures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.‖ 39 In any emergency scenario,
the President may take unilateral action before seeking Congressional approval, and,
when the opportunity presents itself, may subsequently seek verification from
Congress.40 According to John Locke, this unrestrained power can be a concern and
a potential threat to the liberty of the people.
[T]he Reigns of good Princes have been always most dangerous to the
Liberties of their People. For when their Successors, managing the
Government with different Thoughts, would draw the Actions of those
28

Id.

29

Telman, supra note 13, at 149.

30

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 497.

35

Id.

36

Id. at 498 (quoting Training of British Flying Students in the United States, 40 Op. Att‘y
Gen. 58, 61-62 (1941)).
37

Id. at 497.

38

Id.

39

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.

40

See Yoo, supra note 3, at 304.
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good Rulers into Precedent, and make them the Standard of their
Prerogative, as if what had been done only for the good of the People was
a right in them to do, for the harm of the People, if they so pleased; it has
often occasioned Contest, and sometimes public Disorders, before the
People could recover their original Right, and get that to be declared not
to be Prerogative, which truly was never so.41
Locke‘s reference to the ―prerogative of the people‖ rings true even today, as the
specific, enumerated powers of the President of the United States have long been
subject to dispute.42 According to Locke, the executive branch must be able to deal
with unforeseen issues that arise, especially those which cannot be anticipated by the
legislative branch.43 Where the law does not provide for all scenarios, the President
must have the discretion and the latitude to act in a manner not closely proscribed by
law, so long as it is exercised for the public good. 44
The Commander-in-Chief powers are based on the checks and balances system,
subject to veto by the legislature, and subject to consideration by the judiciary. While
it is true that Congress alone has the power to declare war on other nations,
centralizing authority within the executive permits the ―unitary executive [to]
evaluate threats, consider policy choices, and mobilize military and diplomatic
resources with a speed and energy that is far superior to any other branch.‖ 45
According to Alexander Hamilton, a forward-thinking president can reasonably
operate within the confines of the Constitution to protect the security of the nation. 46
A strong executive would be far more effective and competent for the nation than a
weak one.
Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good
government. It is essential to the protection of the community against
foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the
laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and highhanded
combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to
the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of
faction, and of anarchy . . . It is not less essential to the steady
administration of the laws.47
The far reaching powers of the executive branch are necessary to protect liberty

against any attacks that would create chaos or anarchy within the government. 48

41

Telman, supra note 13, at 135 (quoting John Locke, Second Treatise § 166, in JOHN
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 396 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (1690)).
42
See Julian Davis Mortenson, Executive Power and the Discipline of History, 78 U. CHI.
L. REV. 377 (2011).
43

Telman, supra note 13, at 185.

44

Id.

45

Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 493.

46

See id.

47

THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 436 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., 1902).

48

See id.
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In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), Justice
Jackson laid out a three-pronged test that determined the validity of an exercise of
executive power.49 First, ―[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or
implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum.‖ 50 In this
scenario, Congress has granted explicit congressional authorization for the President
to act.51 When the President and Congress act together to address an emergency
situation, the President's concurrent powers are at their zenith. 52
Second, ―[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a
zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in
which its distribution is uncertain.‖ 53 When the President acts within ―a zone of
twilight,‖54 he acts without congressional authorization for his actions and may face
the ramifications for doing so at a later date. While acting under the ―zone of
twilight,‖ the President‘s independent (as opposed to concurrent) powers are at their
fullest.55 In this case, the President can act with ―all-embracing, swiftly moving
authority.‖56
The powers of the President within this ―zone of twilight‖ must be considered
within certain factors. First, whether ―necessity‖ exists to authorize the President‘s
exercise of powers.57 This increases the likelihood that a court will later favor the
President‘s exercise of discretion.58 The President may act without implied or
express congressional approval, but he cannot act without necessity.59 The greater
the immediate necessity for Presidential action, the greater likelihood that the courts
will sustain the President‘s continuing, independent authority. 60
Finally, the third standard for presidential authority arises ―[w]hen the President
takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his
power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.‖ 61 When the
President acts in violation of an act of Congress, his power ―is at its lowest ebb‖ 62
49

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635-38; Yoo, supra note 3, at 193.

50

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635.

51

See id. at 635-37.

52

Yoo, supra note 3, at 193 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635).

53

Id. at 637.

54

Yoo, supra note 3, at 192-93 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637).

55

Kirk L. Davies, The Imposition of Martial Law in the United States, 49 A.F.L. REV. 67,
110 (2005).
56

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 613.

57

Davies, supra note 55, at 109.

58

Id.

59

Id (emphasis added).

60

Id.

61

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637.

62

Id.
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because he acts against congressional authority. This creates substantial risk, both
legally and politically, for the President, and his actions must be strongly
scrutinized.63
This seminal analysis by Justice Jackson in Youngstown has remained the
foremost interpretation of the President‘s exercise of his executive powers. Justice
Jackson further noted: ―The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not
and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches . . .
presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or
conjunction with those of Congress.‖ 64 Justice Jackson determined that the decision
to deploy military force was reserved to the executive branch and remained among
the President‘s enumerated powers only ―to the extent that the constitutional text
does not explicitly allocate the power to initiate military hostilities to a particular
branch.‖65
The Court has long held that ―in the declared exercise of [the President‘s] powers
as Commander in Chief of the Army in time of war and of grave public danger[, is]
not to be set aside by the courts without the clear conviction that [it is] in conflict
with the Constitution or laws of Congress.‖66 Only ―except upon the clearest
conviction that it cannot be reconciled with the Constitution and the constitutional
legislation of Congress‖67 could any Presidential action be set aside by the courts.
Similarly, in the Prize Cases, the extent of the President‘s power to institute a
blockade was ―to be decided by him‖ and would be left up to ―the political
department of the [g]overnment to which this power was entrusted.‖ 68
The President‘s constitutional authority flows from both his unique position in
the constitutional structure and from the specific grants of authority assigned by
Article II.69 It is clear that, based on Youngstown and its progeny, in an emergency
situation ―the President enjoys full discretion in determining what level of force to
use when addressing the emergency situation.‖ 70 The President‘s enumerated powers
dictate that he be granted the power to act specifically for the good of the nation in
such situations.71 This must be in the clear and informed manner that Locke
proscribed, to prevent substantial ―public disorder.‖72

63

Davies, supra note 55, at 110-11.

64

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635.

65

Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 495.

66

Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942).

67

Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 133 (1866).

68

Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 490 (quoting The Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635, 670
(1862)).
69

Id. at 494 (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749-50 (1982)).

70
Id. at 490 (quoting The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635,
670 (1862)).
71

Telman, supra note 13, at 135 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
396 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (1690)).
72

Id.
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B. Judicial Oversight of Executive Powers
The Supreme Court has historically supported the Executive‘s decisions and
independent powers in emergency scenarios. However, questions still arise over
whether the Court has continuing jurisdiction over the actions of the President in
such emergency cases.73 According to Justice Frankfurter in Youngstown, the
Judiciary is not ―the overseer of our government.‖ 74 Justice Frankfurter also noted
that ―[j]udicial power can be exercised only as to . . . ‗[c]ases‘ or ‗[c]ontroversies‘ . .
. Rigorous adherence to the narrow scope of the judicial function is especially
demanded in controversies that arouse appeals to the Constitution.‖75 Furthermore,
he agreed that, as the power of Commander in Chief is assigned solely to the
President, the extent of his powers is decided by the President 76 and not by the
Courts.77
The Court has held that the President has independent authority and the need to
be free from interference in a variety of cases.78 In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137
(1803), Justice Marshall found that ―the president is invested with certain important
political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is
accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience.
[B]eing entrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive.‖ 79
According to Justice Marshall, the Court does not have the jurisdiction to address
political questions, including, for example, issues of emergency health situations,
foreign affairs or war making powers. 80 ―Questions in their nature political, or which
are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in
this [C]ourt.‖81
The Court has historically held that the President may ―employ [his powers] in
the manner he may deem most effectual. 82 In Luther v. Borden,83 the Court clarified
that the President may ―call forth such number of the militia of any other [s]tate or
[s]tates, as may be applied for, as he may judge sufficient to suppress such
insurrection.‖84 In the Prize Cases,85 the Court determined that the President, while
73

Al-Ghizzawi v. Bush, No. 05-2378(JDB), 2006 WL 2844781, at *1 (D.D.C., 2006).

74

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 594.

75

Id.

76

The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1863).

77

Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 490.

78

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 582 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 320 (1936)).
79

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 166 (1803).

80

Id. at 170.

81

Id.

82

Flemming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 615 (1850).

83

Luther v. Bordon, 48 U.S. 1 (1849). Here, the Court held that, whether state
governments are protected by the Constitution under Article IV pursuant to the ―republican
forms of government‖ clause is an inherently political and non-justiciable question to be
resolved by the President and Congress. Id. at 32.
84

Id.
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fulfilling his duties as Commander-in-Chief, was justified in instituting a blockade
against the [s]outhern [s]tates. The Court ruled that it did not have the judicial
oversight to question the President‘s actions, but must leave this decision to ―the
political department of the [g]overnment to which this power was entrusted.‖ 86
More recently, in Hamdi,87 the Court held that the President‘s power to act
unilaterally falls squarely within the President‘s enumerated powers, and that the
Court lacks the expertise and capacity to second-guess that decision.88 According to
Justice Thomas, ―[t]he power to protect the [n]ation ought to exist without limitation
because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national
exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be
necessary to satisfy them.‖89 The President is far better equipped to address
emergency issues that may arise than the judicial branch; the former has almost
unlimited resources and methodology for addressing emergent issues while the latter
is limited to judicial oversight.90
The Court cannot reasonably prevent the executive branch from accomplishing
its constitutionally assigned functions. 91 When circumstances arise that may
endanger the safety of the nation, ―constitutional shackles‖ cannot be imposed on the
President.92 The President must be free to act with somewhat unfettered discretion in
areas.93 When the Court extends judicial review into areas ―where it does not know,
and has no way of finding out, what serious harm it may be doing,‖ 94 this reduces
the vested responsibility of the Executive. 95
C. Legislative Oversight of Executive Powers
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.

- U.S. CONST. amend. X.
In drafting the Constitution, the Framers changed the division of powers that had
traditionally been regarded as ―executive,‖ and instead assigned them to Congress in
Article I, while expressly maintaining other elements as enumerated executive
powers in Article II.96 For instance, the power to declare war was originally provided
85

The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 641 (1863).

86

Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 490.

87

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516.

88

Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

89

Id. at 580.

90

See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 493.

91

Id. at 490 (quoting Nixon v. Adm‘r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)).

92

Yoo, supra note 3, at 270.

93

See generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 688-94 (1988).

94
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 586 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Ramirez de Arellano v.
Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1550-51 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
95

Id.

96

Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 5, at 494.
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to Congress and the Commander-in-Chief authority was expressly reserved for the
President.97 Clearly then, ―[i]n the area of domestic legislation, the Constitution
creates a detailed, finely wrought procedure in which Congress plays the central
role.‖98 This does not appertain to situations where the President must act
independently of Congress.99
According to Justice Thomas, ―Congress cannot anticipate and legislate with
regard to every possible action the President may find it necessary to take or every
possible situation in which he might act.‖ 100 Congress‘s power to declare war does
not place limitations on the President‘s ―independent and plenary constitutional
authority‖101 regarding the use of military force. The reason for this is because
otherwise, ―the President is left powerless at the very moment when the need for
action may be most pressing and when no one, other than he, is immediately capable
of action.‖102
The President‘s war-making powers are historically subject to the whim of
Congress.103 While a President requires Congressional approval to declare war on a
sovereign nation, Congress may later chose to veto the President‘s declaration of war
or deny the President the necessary funds to continue the war. 104 However, in the
case of an emergency action, such as a disaster occurring within a state whereas the
President has to send in the National Guard to maintain order, the President‘s powers
must be absolute and not subject to congressional or judicial scrutiny. 105
As Justice Jackson stated, ―[p]residential powers are not fixed but fluctuate,
depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.‖ 106
Therefore, no statute can place any limits on the President's decision of how to
adequately respond in an emergency situation. 107 These decisions under our
Constitution can only be logically made by the President. 108 In United States v.
Midwest Oil Co., the United States argued that:
[t]he function of making laws is peculiar to Congress, and the Executive
can not exercise that function to any degree. But this is not to say that all
97
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of the subjects concerning which laws might be made are perforce
removed from the possibility of Executive influence. . . . The President is
the active agent, not of Congress, but of the Nation. As such he performs
the duties which the Constitution lays upon him immediately, and as such,
also, he executes the laws and regulations adopted by Congress. He is the
agent of the people of the United States, deriving all his powers from
them and responsible directly to them. In no sense is he the agent of
Congress. . . . Therefore it follows that in ways short of making laws or
disobeying them, the Executive may be under a grave constitutional duty
to act for the national protection in situations not covered by the acts of
Congress, and in which, even, it may not be said that his action is the
direct expression of any particular one of the independent powers which
are granted to him specifically by the Constitution. 109
As such, the Executive is tasked with the authority to act for the national protection
in scenarios where Congress cannot contemplate judicious action. 110 Despite this,
strict scrutiny proponents of presidential authority have claimed that, when the
President acts to resolve an emergency scenario, he is not authorized to do so
without the express permission of Congress. 111 These claimants bring Section 2(c) of
The War Powers Resolution,112 which states that:
[t]he constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to
introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2)
specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by
attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed
forces.113
Congress included three mechanisms in the Act designed to ensure congressional
participation in the war-making process.114 First, the President must consult with
Congress, whenever possible, before introducing armed forces into hostilities,
whether the conflict is imminent or actual. 115 Second, the President must report to
Congress within forty-eight hours of introducing such armed forces, detailing why
the President sent the troops, describing the constitutional and legislative authority
for the action, and estimating the scope and duration of the action. 116 Finally, once
the President has submitted his reasoning, he must terminate the intervention within
sixty days.117 The only exceptions are, unless there is a declaration of war, Congress
109
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authorizes an extension or Congress cannot meet due to an armed attack on the
U.S.118 The Act also declares that Congress may terminate the President‘s use of
force at any time by concurrent resolution.119
The Executive branch has historically taken the position that the War Powers Act
is unconstitutional. According to the Justice Department, ―section 2(c) of the War
Powers Resolution does not constitute a legally binding definition of Presidential
authority to deploy our armed forces.‖ 120 Moreover, this legislation is viewed by the
Executive as ―incomplete or is not meant to be binding.‖ 121 No President has ever
acknowledged the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, and no President
has ever formally complied with its terms in emergencies.122 In fact, several
Attorney Generals have held that Presidential action in times of emergency is
expressly constitutional ―without specific prior Congressional approval‖ 123 as long as
they are for the purpose of ―missions of good will or rescue, or for the purpose of
protecting American lives or property or American interests.‖ 124 Attorney General
Frank Murphy also stated in a speech to the U.S. Senate on the Emergency Powers
of the President:
the Executive has powers not enumerated in the statutes. . . . It is
universally recognized that the constitutional duties of the Executive carry
with them the constitutional powers necessary for their proper
performance. These constitutional powers have never been specifically
defined, and in fact cannot be, since their extent and limitations are
largely dependent upon conditions and circumstances. . . . The right to
take specific action might not exist under one state of facts, while under
another it might be the absolute duty of the Executive to take such
action.125
Likewise, Attorney General John K. Richards once wrote that the Executive must
act to preserve our national integrity and the interests which are entrusted to him. 126
―In the protection of these fundamental rights . . . the President is not limited to the
enforcement of specific acts of Congress . . . [t]o do this, he must preserve, protect,
and defend those fundamental rights which flow from the Constitution and belong to
the sovereignty it created.‖127 Mr. Richards‘ modest views of the Presidency are
118
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echoed by the founders‘ intent to create presidential authority that superseded
congressional oversight when faced with an imminent crisis.
The War Powers Act has a contentious and tumultuous history. 128
Notwithstanding the constitutionality of the Act, the President has the constitutional
powers to act independently of Congress when necessary to protect the rights and
liberties of the citizens.129 Any deprivation of the power allocated to the President to
determine when to use military force in the case of an emergency would ―disrupt the
basic constitutional framework.‖130 While placing unchecked powers in the hands of
the executive branch could be dangerous to liberty with the unrestricted potential for
abuse,131 the Court has stated that ―it would be difficult to point out any other hands
in which this power would be more safe, and at the same time equally effectual.‖ 132
This power ―is conferred by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must
therefore be respected and enforced.‖133
III. THE ENUMERATED EMERGENCY POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
A. Emergency Powers
The Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution sets forth that ―all
powers not delegated to the government of the United States are reserved to the
several states or to the people.‖134 The Articles of Confederation guaranteed to each
state its ―sovereignty, freedom and independence and every power, jurisdiction and
right, which is not . . . expressly delegated to the United States is retained by the
states.135 These documents grant certain express, unalienable rights to the states to be
free from interference by the federal government. 136
While these historical documents may be read as a check against the executive
branch during an emergency scenario, the President does have some indirect
authority over the matter.137 ―As Commander-in-Chief, [the President] is authorized
to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his
command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual‖ 138
Moreover, the Constitution provides the ―power [to] the executive branch of the
government to preserve order and insure the public safety in times of emergency,
128
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when other branches of the government are unable to function, or their functioning
would itself threaten the public safety.‖139
For example, in the rare instance where a state refuses to send in military forces
to address an emergency, such as a revolt by the populace or a terrifying health
quarantine, the President must realize his authority to act in these situations. No
governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the nation. 140 It is also
expressed during these scenarios that ―the President should not report to Congress
or, indeed, to anyone else.‖141 According to Justice Story, ―[i]t may be fit and proper
for the government, in the exercise of the high discretion confided to the executive,
for great public purposes, to act on a sudden emergency, or to prevent an irreparable
mischief, by summary measures, which are not found in the text of the laws.‖142
Presidential authority may be expanded during such times of emergency. In
Youngstown, Justice Frankfurter dictated that ―a systematic, unbroken, executive
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before
questioned, engaged in by Presidents . . . may be treated as a gloss on executive
power vested in the President.‖143 Justice Frankfurter‘s concurrence established a
three-pronged test for the legitimate expansion of executive powers. 144 First, the
Executive‘s practice must be systematic, unbroken, and long pursued.145 Second,
Congress must knowingly acquiesce to the practice. 146 Third, the Executive may not
violate any unambiguous constitutional commands or statutes.147
―The President‘s authority to deploy armed forces has been exercised in a broad
range of circumstances [in] our history.‖ 148 Emergency situations sometimes arise in
foreign, rather than domestic matters. ―The United States frequently employs armed
forces outside this country—over 200 times in our history—for the protection of
American citizens or national security.‖149 On August 20, 1998, President Clinton
ordered the armed forces to strike at terrorist-related facilities in Afghanistan and
Sudan because ―of the threat they present[ed] to our national security.‖ 150 President
Clinton continued, ―when our very national security is challenged . . . we must take
139
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extraordinary steps to protect the safety of our citizens.‖ 151 Here, President Clinton
viewed his emergency authority independent of Congress and acted to protect the
nation against imminent terrorist threats. 152
According to Justice Vinson in Youngstown:
[w]hile emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish the
occasion for the exercise of power. The Framers knew, as we should
know in these times of peril, that there is real danger in Executive
weakness. There is no cause to fear Executive tyranny so long as the laws
of Congress are being faithfully executed. Certainly there is no basis for
fear of dictatorship when the Executive acts, as he did in this case, only to
save the situation until Congress could act. 153
So long as the Executive did not create a basis for claims of ―arbitrary action,
unlimited powers or dictatorial usurpation of congressional power,‖ 154 the Court was
willing to overlook the matter of any ―executive tyranny‖ in handling emergency
situations.155
Another issue arising recently deals with the government‘s detainment of
individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism during wartime situations. The
Court held in Hamdi that ―the [g]overnment‘s regulatory interest in community
safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual's liberty interest.
For example, in times of war or insurrection, when society‘s interest is at its peak,
the government may detain individuals whom the government believes to be
dangerous.‖156 According to the Court, the Executive‘s power to protect the nation in
these circumstances should be unrestrained because,
it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national
exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which
may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that endanger the
safety of nations are infinite; and for this reason no constitutional shackles
can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is
committed.157
The Hamdi Court stepped beyond Youngstown, ruling that national emergencies
dictate the existence of an executive authority, free from ―constitutional shackles,‖ 158
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which would not subsequently give rise to the ―executive tyranny‖ 159 envisioned in
Youngstown.
Similarly, in the legislative record, Congress has explicitly authorized military
involvement in domestic affairs when civilian authorities are overwhelmed. 160 The
Federal statute, entitled Use of Militia and Armed Forces to enforce Federal
Authority,161 states:
[w]henever the President considers that unlawful obstructions,
combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the
United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United
States in any State or Territory by the ordinary course of judicial
proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any
State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to
enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion.162
This statute permits the Executive to employ the military in an emergency situation,
specifically in the instance of a domestic uprising or a health quarantine. 163 The
doctrine of necessity has spoken for wartime emergency actions, as well as situations
requiring the seizure of a private facility for clearing away dangerous conditions. 164
Seizing property may require due compensation under the ―takings clause,‖ 165 but
does not encroach on the rights of the legislature. 166
Indeed, the judicial record is replete with controversy over the Executive
emergency powers.167 In Ex parte Milligan, the Court noted that ―[t]he Constitution
of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and
covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all
circumstances.‖168 This statement is just the beginning of discourse against
broadening Executive powers in emergency scenarios. The Court further reasons that
―[n]o doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the
wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great
exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or
159
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despotism.‖169 According to the Milligan Court, the government, acting within the
confines of the Constitution, has ―all the powers granted to it, which are necessary to
preserve its existence.‖170 When the executive branch failed to follow the necessary
and proper procedures that were established by Congress, the President took
―measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress.‖171
This result was intended to address the prevailing opinion at the time that,
according to Justice Jackson in Youngstown, ―[the Framers] knew what emergencies
were, knew the pressures they engender for authoritative action, knew, too, how they
afford a ready pretext for usurpation . . . they suspected that emergency powers
would tend to kindle emergencies.‖ 172 Justice Jackson argued that the Framers did
not envision a constitutional conception of emergency powers for the Executive and
did not intend to broaden these same powers except with Congressional or judicial
oversight.173
In more recent decisions, the Court has ventured off the historical path by
refusing to impede the Executive in the exercise of its emergency powers. In
Hirabayashi, the Court concluded that, ―[w]here . . . the conditions call for the
exercise of judgment and discretion and for the choice of means by those branches of
the Government on which the Constitution has placed the responsibility of warmaking, it is not for any court to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or to
substitute its judgment for theirs.‖174 The Court dictated that it could not reasonably
intrude on delicate matters where the Executive has discretion. 175 The Court also
specifically referred to the Executive‘s emergency powers in Hibayashi, when it
stated that ―it is enough that circumstances within the knowledge of those charged
with the responsibility for maintaining the national defense afforded a rational basis
for the decision which they made. Whether we would have made it is irrelevant.‖ 176
Similarly, in Korematsu, the Court held that ―when under conditions of modern
warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be
commensurate with the threatened danger.‖177 This is clearly applicable to a
domestic emergency scenario. While a President must be permitted to act outside of
the boundaries of congressional authority in an emergency scenario, the Court has
dictated that a standing President cannot be permitted to act beyond the boundaries
of reason.178
The expansive ―rational basis‖ standard of Hirabayashi and Korematsu carries
weight even as recent as 2011, when President Obama argued that he had the right to
169
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engage in warfare through military operations in Libya.179 The administration
contended that U.S. forces in Libya engaged in ―a limited and well-defined mission
in support of international efforts to protect civilians and prevent a humanitarian
disaster.‖180 President Obama argued that his actions were justified absent a formal
declaration of war against Libya, pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution of
1973, and that his actions were ―in the national security and foreign policy interests
of the United States, pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign
relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive.‖ 181 The Court noted its
dismay that the claimants were attempting to circumvent constitutional authority to
―achieve what appear to be purely political ends, when it should be clear to them that
this Court is powerless to depart from clearly established precedent of the Supreme
Court and the District of Columbia Circuit.‖ 182 On this basis, the Court dismissed the
matter.183
This case echoes the result in Campbell v. Clinton, when several members of
Congress sued over President Clinton‘s military campaign in Yugoslavia. 184 There,
the Court found that Congress had a broad range of legislative remedies and could
have noted their objection to the Yugoslavian mission in that manner, rather than
appealing to the judiciary that was precluded from entering the fray due to the
political question doctrine.185
B. Posse Comitatus
The President has the power under the doctrine of ―posse comitatus,‖ or ―power
of the county,‖ to call on the populace to assist in maintaining order or to apprehend
criminals.186 In other words, the government can ask the community to engage in
civil law enforcement.187 This concept has been sanctioned by Congress for the
express purpose of ―maintaining order or law enforcement, so long as military
personnel are not directly engaged in searches or arrests.‖ 188
The Posse Comitatus Act was enacted in 1878, ―[i]n response to the military
presence in the [s]outhern [s]tates during the Reconstruction Era‖ 189 and in ―the
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perceived abuses of involving the military in various civilian responsibilities.‖190
Congress intended the Act to prevent military personnel from executing laws or
directly involving themselves in civilian law enforcement activities that were not
under their auspices.191
The origin of the Posse Comitatus Act192 arose from the traditional American
dislike for a strong military role in society, the very crux of the American
Revolution.193 When the colonies submitted their ―Declaration of Independence‖ to
the King of Great Britain, they listed numerous complaints against the King‘s
excessive use of the military.194 These grievances included the following: ―He has
erected a multitude of [n]ew [o]ffices, and sent hither swarms of [o]fficers to harass
our people, and eat out their substance. He has kept among us, in times of peace,
[s]tanding [a]rmies, without the consent of our legislatures. He has affected to render
the [m]ilitary independent of and superior to the [c]ivil power.‖ 195 Our nation‘s
founding fathers were rightfully afraid that the [e]xecutive branch, in the exercise of
its constitutional powers, would act to limit individual rights against the consent of
the legislature.196 After the close of the Civil War, the U.S. continued to occupy the
former [c]onfederate [s]outhern states, but agreed to withdraw these troops during
the 1876 election—thereby ending Reconstruction and setting the stage for the
enacting of the Posse Comitatus Act.197
As Justice Murphy stated, ―From time immemorial despots have used real or
imagined threats to the public welfare as an excuse for needlessly abrogating human
rights. That excuse is no less unworthy of our traditions when used in this day of
atomic warfare or at a future time when some other type of warfare may be
devised.‖198 The founders intended for a congressional check against the misuse of
federal forces to enforce the law of the land.199 This premise was established through
the Posse Comitatus Act.200
More recently, the military has become increasingly involved in domestic
affairs.201 Critics have disclaim that the American populace has historically
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displayed a ―strong aversion to military involvement in civil affairs,‖ 202 and that
citizens ―applaud the military's entering into such popular battles like the fight
against illegal drugs, but once the enemy becomes the average American under strict
conditions of martial law, that applause would likely be quickly silenced.‖ 203
However, according to the Code of Federal Regulations, ―The Constitution and Acts
of Congress establish six exceptions, generally applicable within the entire territory
of the United States, to which the Posse Comitatus Act prohibition does not
apply.‖204 These exceptions, including the Force Acts, include insurrections within a
state, with the permission of the governor, rebellions where enforcement of federal
law is impractical, or an insurrection which impedes the state‘s ability to protect
citizens of their constitutional rights, and the state is unable or unwilling to protect
those rights.205 More specifically, one of these exceptions is an emergency authority
by the executive branch to prevent lost of life or property during serious disturbances
or calamities.206
One of the most well known examples of the use of the emergency exception to
the Posse Comitatus statute is the 1957 incident over the ―Little Rock Nine‖ at
Central High School, in Little Rock, Arkansas. 207 A federal injunction was issued
against the Governor of Arkansas, which prevented the Governor from using the
National Guard to prevent integration of Arkansas public schools. 208 Under the Posse
Comitatus Act, President Eisenhower federalized the Arkansas National guard
troops.209 This effectively overruled the authority of Governor Orval Faubus, and
prevented him from using the State National Guard to prevent nine black students
from desegregating Central High School, in Little Rock.210
At the time, the Attorney General advised President Eisenhower that ―the [P]osse
[C]omitatus [S]tatute was not intended to limit the President's authority to deal with
mob violence or similar threats to enforcement of federal law.‖ Nevertheless, the
―Little Rock Nine‖ entered the school under the protection of 1,000 members of the
101st Airborne Division of the U.S. Army. 211 Thus, Presidents have the authority to
act to protect the public welfare and to secure the civil rights and civil liberties of the
American people; even by force, if necessary.

202

Id.

203

Id. at 76-77.

204

Id. at 81 (quoting 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c)(2)(i)(a-d)).

205

Davies, supra note 55, at 81.

206

Id.

207

See McCormack, supra note 160, at 80.

208

Id. at 79 n.51.

209

Craig Rains, Little Rock Central High 40th Anniversary, http://www.centralhigh57.org
(last visited Feb. 1, 2012).
210

Id.

211

Id.

286

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 25:265

The Posse Comitatus Statute was used by the executive branch to address
conflicts that have arisen over the national security of the nation. 212 Threats against
national security have become more apparent with incidents such as the bombing of
the federal plaza in Oklahoma City, the February 26, 1993 World Trade Center
garage bombing, and the attacks on the twin towers on September 11, 2001, among
others. It has now become of paramount importance that the executive branch have
the authority to act independently if necessary to respond to the threats posed to the
nation‘s safety.213 When President Clinton announced that he was increasing federal
funding to fight a variety of terrorist attacks, many protested the President‘s actions
for independently increasing the military‘s role in civil law enforcement. 214 Despite
the public furor, federal programs have continued to prepare for immediate incident
response and recovery involvement, with an annual exercise conducted by the
Department of Homeland Security each year to prepare for such causality. 215
C. Martial Law
[Is] it possible to lose the nation and yet preserve the Constitution?216
A third possibility for the President during a national emergency, where the
President must overrule the inherent powers of the state, includes an act of martial
law, ―the rule which is established when civil authority in the community is made
subordinate to military, either in repelling invasions or when the ordinary
administration of the laws fail to secure the proper objects of the government.‖ 217
The Supreme Court has limited the definition of martial law to ―the law of
military necessity in the actual presence of war. It is administered by the general of
the army, and is in fact his will. Of necessity it is arbitrary, but it must be obeyed.‖ 218
Interestingly enough, the ―term ‗martial law‘ itself carries no precise meaning. The
Constitution does not refer to ‗martial law‘ at all and no ‗Act of Congress‘ has
defined the term further.‖219 It is clear, however, that martial law extends beyond
―war.‖220 If a widespread terrorist attack occurred, which severely incapacitated the
governor of a state or rendered him unwilling to control the populace, the President

212
See generally Col. Craig Trebilcock, Resurrecting Posse Comitatus in the Post-9/11
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would be qualified to declare ―war on terrorism‖ and use martial law to control the
government of that state.221
The Milligan Court222 laid out express requirements for a declaration of martial
law. The requirements are either, a condition of necessity, domestic war of some
form, when the courts are closed,223 or actual war.224 However, one final caveat that
the Milligan Court established, was that ―any exercise of emergency power by the
President must be viewed in conjunction with congressional will.‖ 225 While
obtaining ―congressional will‖226 is not always feasible, this facet of Milligan exists
because ―just as emergencies do not create power and unenumerated powers do not
mean undefined powers, the President's power to impose martial law must not be
limitless.‖227
Fearing an unlimited abuse of Presidential powers, the Milligan Court
endeavored to check warrantless Presidential action in a time of conflict. Other than
a condition of necessity, there are only very narrow circumstances where martial law
may be established.228 An emergency must exist in to declare martial law. 229 One
view of what constitutes an emergency was illustrated in Texas during the Great
Depression. There the governor of Texas attempted to declare martial law 230 in the
absence of an emergency, attempting to limit oil well production.231 The Supreme
Court determined that ―[i]t is the emergency that gives the right, and the emergency
must be shown to exist before the taking can be justified.‖ 232 Furthermore, ―[i]f a
national emergency is so severe that the civilian courts are not able to meet and
enjoin the declaration of martial law, then probably the emergency justifies the
declaration.‖233
While it is true that Congress has the authority to ―call[] forth the [m]ilitia to
execute the [l]aws of the [u]nion,‖234 it is the duty of the Executive to ―take [c]are
that the [l]aws be faithfully executed‖ 235 Thus, in an instance where the local militia
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cannot maintain order, the President must declare martial law.236 This effectively
overrules any congressional authority, and establishes police powers solely within
the executive branch.237
Martial law is not only applicable to the civilian populace, but can also be used to
dictate the actions of the government towards those same civilians. According to a
Department of Defense (DOD) directive, ―[t]he primary responsibility for protecting
life and property and maintaining law and order in the civilian community is vested
in the [s]tate and local government.‖238 When conflict arises, the DOD has the power
to overrule other responsibilities of alternative federal agencies to ensure the safety
of lives.239
In a specific domestic disaster relief, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) is the lead federal agency. 240 ―While FEMA‘s primary
responsibilities lie in the area of disaster or consequence management . . . they are
neither trained nor manned to handle scenarios involving insurrection.‖ 241 Therefore,
in such a scenario, under a declaration of martial law, the President can remove
―FEMA from its primary role in consequence management‖ and mandate that ―the
Department of Defense take over the process under a proclamation of martial
law.‖242
Where a declaration of martial law is a necessity, the realization is that
congressional powers are abstained, and the President has the responsibility to act
appropriately. A hypothetical example of the President‘s declaration of martial law
can be seen in the movie ―The Siege,‖—a movie depicting a realistic version of
martial law. In the movie, after numerous terrorist attacks in New York, the
President declared martial law.243 By doing so, the President effectively permitted
the army to go from house to house, searching for Middle-Eastern men.244 When the
army discovered ―suspects,‖ it would gather these individuals and put them in
detention camps, torturing and killing any suspect who objected.245 While ―the
Siege‖ was probably not an accurate representation of what would actually transpire
if the President declared martial law, the movie reflects some of the fears and the
arguments against declaring martial law in any given scenario.
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On April 29, 1992, a real life instance of ―the Siege‖ occurred,246 but the attacks
were caused by American citizens rather than foreign terrorists. 247 Following the
acquittal of several police officers accused of beating Rodney King, mob rule broke
out in Los Angeles and protesters began committing multiple acts of arson and
violence, including the severe beating of truck driver Reginald Denny. 248 Later that
day, the Governor of California mobilized the California National Guard (CANG)
and imposed a dawn-to-dusk curfew within Los Angeles and the surrounding
counties. Over the next two days, at least two thousand CANG officers were
deployed around the Los Angeles area.249
On May 1 and 2, 1992, the President deployed four thousand federal troops to the
area from Camp Pendleton and Fort Ord, California, federalized the CANG, and
replaced several CANG divisions with United States Marines. 250 The failure of the
CANG to effectively maintain order was largely due to an ineffective aid agreement
with the Los Angeles Police Department, an insufficient budget for troops, and most
importantly, a larger than anticipated mob size. 251 Eventually, almost ten thousand
CANG soldiers were deployed!252 Several days later the riots faded, and throughout
the course of the following weeks, the President ended the federalization of the
CANG troops and disbanded the CANG.253
At the time of the 1992 Los Angeles riots, civilian law enforcement agencies
were unable to cope with the widespread rioting and were forced to rely upon
National Guard and federal troops to help restore order. 254 However, this large-scale
incident has shown that necessity is a requirement for a declaration of martial law.
What constitutes necessity is a question of fact. 255 Scholars have noted that ―martial
law is the public law of necessity. Necessity calls it forth, necessity justifies its
exercise, and necessity measures the extent and degree to which it may be
employed.‖256 While the Supreme Court has recognized that in various instances
martial law may be necessary,257 there is only one requirement for a continued act of
246
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martial law, i.e., sustaining martial law even after the imminent threat may have
abated.258 That condition is a continued state of necessity.
On December 7, 1941, following the surprise attack by the Japanese on Pearl
Harbor, Hawaii, the Governor of Hawaii suspended habeas corpus and placed the
Territory of Hawaii under martial law. 259 Upon this declaration, the Commanding
General declared himself to be the military governor of Hawaii, and promptly shut
down the courts in the state.260 He then established military courts for the sole
purpose of trying civilians under martial law. 261 The sentences imposed by military
courts are not reviewable on appeal because military tribunals are not part of the
judicial system.262 Several months after the attack, the declaration of martial law was
slowly withdrawn.263 Eventually, civil courts were authorized to exercise their
normal functions.264
Two individuals were brought before the military courts after the status quo had
resumed in Hawaii.265 They were sentenced by a military tribunal, subject to the laws
of war instead of regular trial court.266 These individuals appealed, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Duncan v. Kahanamoku.267 In its opinion, the Court held
that ―the phrase ‗martial law‘ . . . while intended to authorize the military to act
vigorously for the maintenance of an orderly civil government and for the defense of
the island against actual or threatened rebellion or invasion, was not intended to
authorize the supplanting of courts by military tribunals.‖ 268
In Duncan, the Court ruled that when courts were available (even when not
utilized) for the trial of civilian matters, military tribunals, vis-à-vis martial law,
could not ―supplant‖ the legal authority of these courts. The Court adopted the view
that ―martial law provides a type of self-defensive use of force commensurate with
necessity,‖ and allows the military ―to override some of the normal operations of the
civil authorities, to provide for law enforcement and maintenance of order, without
supplanting the civil judicial function.‖ 269 In sum, when the traditional courts are in
operation and available to the parties, the use of military tribunals surpasses the
executive branch‘s authority in a martial law scheme.270
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Therefore, necessity must exist in order for the President to declare martial
law.271 There must be a situation where all alternative options have been exhausted,
and the consensus must be that the situation demands a declaration of martial law.272
Once a declaration of martial law has been made, the military receives the power to
―do all acts which are reasonably necessary for the purpose of restoring and
maintaining public order.‖273 This includes ―restricting individuals‘ movement,
imposing punishment through military trials, and suspending other fundamental
rights.‖274
D. Immediate Response
This is no time for timorous action.275
Finally, of all of the possible applications of Presidential authority previously
listed, the concept of ―immediate response‖ is the most significant yet the least
regulated. An immediate response scenario applies to extreme situations where the
President must take immediate action in response to a disaster or terrorist attack. 276
After a severe disaster takes place, rioting, insurrection, or other serious disturbances
are likely. As these incidents ―would hamper efforts to counteract the effects of the
disaster,‖277 immediate action is crucial to ―prevent human suffering, save lives, or
mitigate great property damage, even without prior authorization‖278 to counteract
the effects of the disaster. This principle exists only within an exigent emergency
scenario that ―overwhelms the capabilities of local authorities.‖279
Immediate response was implemented when Timothy McVeigh bombed the
Alfred P. Murrah federal building on April 19, 1995.280 The Oklahoma City bombing
was the largest domestic terrorist attack in the history of the United States, killing
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168 individuals and seriously wounding 800 more. 281 The bombing marked the
largest act of terrorism within U.S. borders prior to September 11, 2001.282 Due to
the large scale of fatalities and injured, this attack on the federal building decimated
the ability of the local authorities to immediately respond to the attack. 283 However,
the military was able to assist local authorities by providing ―medevac aircraft,
ambulances, bomb detection dog teams, and various military personnel.‖ 284 Military
―commanders at Fort Sill and Tinker Air Force Base provided this support under the
theory of the . . . immediate response authority.‖ 285
Another instance of immediate response necessity occurred when the largest ever
terrorist attack on the United States transpired on September 11, 2001.286 Nineteen
hijackers, under the aegis of a terrorist group known as Al-Quaeda, led by Osama
Bin-Laden, took control of four airplanes. 287 Two planes were each flown, eighteen
minutes apart, into the economic symbol of the U.S., the World Trade Center twin
towers.288 Two hours later, both towers collapsed. 289 A third plane was flown into the
Department of Defense Headquarters, the Pentagon. 290 A fourth plane was crashed
outside Pennsylvania, evidently intended for the White House or the U.S. Capitol. 291
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There were no survivors in any of the planes. 292 The death toll for all four incidents
reached almost three thousand victims. 293 This series of tragic events became known
worldwide as ―9/11.‖ In response to the events on 9/11, then-President Bush said,
―I‘ve ordered that the full resources of the federal government to help the victims
and their families and to conduct a full-scale investigation to hunt down and to find
those folks who committed this act.‖294
The immediate response to the 9/11 attacks on the political, economic, and
military might of the United States was necessary, both by law and by symbolic
determination. Without the ability to implement an immediate response, the ability
to ―survive‖ such a devastating attack, both physically and mentally, would have
been impossible. Applying his executive immediate response power in the supreme
case of necessity, the President demonstrated to the world that the United States
could not and would not shirk from the protection of its civilians, and would not be
overwhelmed by such an enormous tragedy even in the face of a major terrorist
attack.295
Finally, the necessity for an executive immediate response power exists within
the category of natural disasters. The SARS H1N1 avian flu pandemic, the 1989
Loma Prieta major earthquake in San Francisco, or the devastating events of
Hurricane Katrina on Louisiana are all instances of when the principle of immediate
response would be necessary.296 The National Response Plan (NRP), intended to
address a wide variety of emergency scenarios, was enacted in December of 2004,
by President Bush under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 in response to
the events of September 11, 2001.297
The scenarios addressed by the NRP include; a biological, nuclear, or
radiological accident or terrorist attack; a natural disaster such as a tsunami,
hurricane, fire, or earthquake; a malicious cyber attack; a food and agriculture
disaster involving the nation‘s food and/or agriculture supply; an incident involving
oil and/or hazardous materials and pollution; a biological health quarantine; or, a
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terrorist attack not involving any of the above circumstances. 298 The NRP likely
would have covered the terrorist attacks of 9/11, intended to wreak havoc on the
economic, military, and political might of the United States. 299
The NRP was developed to establish a unified federal resource which would
assist in the preparedness for, response to, and recovery from terrorism, major
disasters, and other major emergencies. 300 The NRP incorporates input gathered
from numerous public safety organizations, and directed all major aspects of
emergency planning into one cohesive unified discipline. 301 It is intended to assist in
the ―important homeland security mission of preventing terrorist attacks within the
United States; [to reduce] the nation‘s vulnerability to all natural and manmade
hazards; and [to minimize] the damage‖ and assist with the recovery from any type
of disaster that had occurred.302
The NRP was also created to support the executive policies and decision making
entities during the response to a specific threat or incident. 303 It expressly encourages
―cooperation, collaboration, and information-sharing across jurisdictions, as well as
between the government and the private sector at all levels.‖ 304 It modifies existing
agency emergency response plans at the federal, state and local levels, and
formulates ―regional capabilities to ensure sustained operational readiness.‖ 305 The
concept for the NRP arose out of the National Incident Management System, which
created an initial national framework and implementation protocol and guidelines to
be applied in the event of a terrorist attack, major disaster, or public health
emergency.306
The NRP has been successfully implemented during the events surrounding
Hurricane Katrina.307 The hurricane made landfall in Louisiana on August 30,
2005.308 Katrina was a Category 5 hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale
and one of the most costly and deadly hurricanes ever to hit the U.S. 309 The day after
Katrina touched down, then-Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff,
seeing that state executives were unable to handle the extent of the situation, invoked
the NRP to permit FEMA to take control of the developing situation in the gulf

298

Id. at xii-xiii, 64, 68.

299

Id. at xii-xiii.

300

Id. at xii.

301

Id. at 3.

302

Id. at iii.

303

Id. at i.

304

Id.

305

Id. at iii.

306

Id. at 1.

307

RICHARD D. KNABB ET AL., TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT: HURRICANE KATRINA 3 (2005),
available at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.pdf.
308

Id. at 1.

309

Id.

2012]

EMERGENCY POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE

295

coast.310 The resulting damage to the coasts of Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Florida, and Georgia from the hurricane was estimated at over $108 billion, with
over 1,800 deaths throughout five states.311
The effectiveness of the immediate response power may be called into question
given the numerous and widespread allegations of civil rights violations and failures
by FEMA to adequately control the events that took place in the aftermath of
Katrina.312 The ACLU issued a comprehensive report concerning continuing
incidents of racial injustice and human rights abuses, including discrimination and
abuse on the streets, inhumane and dangerous conditions in the prisons, an ongoing
housing crisis involving FEMA trailer parks and affordable housing in safe parts of
the state, and severely limited mental health services for the public. 313 In light of this
information, it is still important to note that without the immediate response powers
available to the President and FEMA, it is likely that the federal response would
have been greatly delayed and many more lives would have been lost, and the
damage would have been substantially more catastrophic.
Despite the allegations of civil liberty violations during Hurricane Katrina, more
recently, the Executive has successfully interceded during several natural disasters
including the deadly tornados in Joplin, Missouri, which destroyed seventy-five
percent of the city of Joplin and caused 160 deaths with nearly $3 billion in
damages.314 The Department of Homeland Security has also played a lead role in
federal response efforts following the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, efforts
which continue to this day.315
In sum, the concept of immediate response is an inherent power granted to the
executive branch, and now subsumed by congressional authority to executive
powers.316 Without these executive ―immediate response‖ powers, the principles of
martial law, or even posse commitatus, would not be immediately available to the
executive branch.317 According to the U.S. Department of Justice, the broad pattern
of presidential initiative continues to exists even in the absence of prior
310
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congressional approval primarily in exigent situations calling for immediate action:
―constitutional practice over two centuries, supported by the nature of the functions
exercised and by the few legal benchmarks that exist, evidences the existence of
broad constitutional power.‖318 It is necessary for the executive branch to have the
express authority to immediately declare a national disaster or apply federal
resources towards an incident without having to go through the traditional red tape of
federal bureaucracy, much of which contributed towards the tragic conditions that
arose after Hurricane Katrina.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF EXPANDED EXECUTIVE POWERS
ON PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES
“Silent Enim Leges Inter Arma.” (Law stands mute in the midst of arms.)
Marcus Tullius Cicero
As demonstrated above, the executive powers are subject to certain checks and
balances. However, an active executive may credibly stretch these powers given
exigent circumstances, most particularly those requiring immediate response to a
crisis.319 There are none more necessary or imminent than in a public health
emergency scenario, where the smallest delay can cause extensive loss of life.
In some circumstances, the executive can tread more cautiously and take the time
to carefully document and justify his actions. But in a health emergency scenario, the
fastest and most direct action is often the most effective. In such a case, the public,
despite knowing that the President‘s actions infringe upon the liberties of the few for
the good of the many, may nonetheless yield without much conflict. One of the
foremost experts on public health ethics of our times, Catholic University law
professor, George P. Smith II,320 summed up the issue of the willingness for
restriction of civil liberties:
[w]hat remains is for the vox populi to be educated as to their
responsibilities of citizenship which demand—in times of national and
public health emergencies—that the common good be protected and
secured, and further, that this responsibility justifies the curtailment of
basic liberties and rights during the time of the emergency. The failure to
recognize or accept this responsibility courts the collapse of society
itself.321
Professor Smith notes that when a health epidemic breaks out, the public is best
suited by allowing the executive to do what it does best, even with the prospect of
having to comply with isolation or quarantine measures, as failure to do so is to
318
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facilitate many more injuries or deaths, i.e., to ―court the collapse of society
itself.‖322 To gain a better understanding of the circumstances within which the
executive may be required to take immediate action, this Article addresses the
judicial and legislative history of the health pandemics that once faced or continue to
face our nation.
A. Emergence of Related Cases
To begin with, Article 1, Section 10, of the U.S. Constitution provides that states
may promulgate and enforce inspection laws. 323 This provision has long been
thought to give states the power to quarantine articles of commerce suspected of
spreading inspection.324 Quarantine is one of the oldest means of regulating for the
public health.325 As early as 1796, the federal government ―enacted the first federal
quarantine law in response to a yellow fever epidemic.‖ 326 That law gave the
President the power to assist states in enforcing their own quarantine laws. 327 In
1799, the Act ―was repealed and replaced with one establishing the first federal
inspection system for maritime quarantines.‖ 328 By 1824, the Supreme Court in
Gibbons v. Ogden recognized the police powers of the state to compel isolation and
quarantine ―to provide for the health of its citizens.‖ 329
Thereafter, throughout the nineteenth century, the states and federal government
undertook an increasingly prominent role in implementing maritime quarantines for
the safety of the nation. Beginning with Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a
Vapeur v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, the Court held that the states have the
power to enact and enforce quarantine laws for the safety and the protection of the
health of their inhabitants.330 And that ―until Congress has exercised its power on the
subject, such state quarantine laws and state laws for the purpose of preventing,
eradicating or controlling the spread of contagious or infectious diseases, are not
repugnant to the Constitution.‖331 More specifically, the Compagnie Court
recognized that state quarantine powers could be displaced by ―affirmative action‖
from Congress and substituted by congress thereby correcting any ―injustifiable and
oppressive exercise of power by state legislation.‖332
322
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Only a few years later, the Court in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,333 deemed the
state powers to impose quarantine as ―the police power,‖334 and recognized that
constitutional liberties do not import the absolute right to be free from restraint. 335
Indeed, in situations of necessity, the common good, including the ―safety, health,
peace, good order, and morals of the community,‖ must overrule the individual
enjoyment of liberty. This is ―liberty regulated by law.‖ 336 The Jacobson Court
implicitly recognized that state or executive powers may be arbitrarily or
capriciously imposed, and hastened to check the speed at which these actions
occurred:
in every well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving
the safety of its members the rights of the individual in respect of
his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be
subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable
regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand.337
Historically, the Court has ―distinctly recognized the authority of a [s]tate to
enact quarantine laws and ‗health laws of every description;‘ indeed, all laws that
relate to matters completely within its territory and which do not by their necessary
operation affect the people of other [s]tates.‖338 The state may broadly apply such
police powers only insofar as the law does not contravene the constitutional rights or
federal authority over such matters.339 As such, in the broader case of a public health
emergency, it is ―the duty of the constituted authorities primarily to keep in view the
welfare, comfort and safety of the many, and not permit the interests of the many to
be subordinated to the wishes or convenience of the few.‖ 340
While necessity may reasonably require a community to protect itself against an
epidemic threatening the safety of all, the Court disclaimed that it would not hesitate
to step in and adjudicate against ―a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the
fundamental law‖ which has no real or substantial relation to the ―public health, the
public morals or the public safety.‖ 341 Conversely, the Court noted that it would not
―invade the domain of local authority except when it is plainly necessary to do so in
order to enforce that law.‖ 342 Along with Compagnie, Jacobson helped pave the way
for later federal national emergency legislation and intervention.
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B. Public Health Legislation
Several pieces of legislation have been enacted for the purpose of dealing with a
health pandemic. In 1976, Congress passed the National Emergencies Act to
formally limit the emergency powers of the president during a state of emergency. 343
The Executive is authorized to declare a national emergency but must specify the
statutory authorities to be used under such declaration, report them to Congress, and
publish this information in the Federal Register. 344 Congress can terminate the
emergency, and it also may be revoked by proclamation of the President. 345 The U.S.
has been under a state of national emergency since 9/11.346
Under the Stafford Act of 1988,347 Congress has also previously sanctioned the
President to commit federal troops to assist state governments during emergencies,
as long as the work is ―essential for the preservation of life and property.‖ 348 The
Stafford Act conditions the President‘s power upon the existence of a natural disaster
and the permission from the governor of the state requesting aid. 349 In the case of a
―major disaster‖ or ―emergency‖ the Stafford Act allows the President to coordinate
administration of disaster relief through FEMA or other government agencies.350 The
state must implement its emergency plan before the President may invoke these
emergency powers.351 However, in the case where the emergency involves ―federal
primary responsibility‖ such as one occurring on a federal property, the President
may overrule state action.352
The Public Health Service Act,353 enacted in 1994, grants the executive unilateral
authorization to declare a national emergency and allows broad discretion during a
public health emergency such as making grants, entering into contracts, investigating
the cause, treatment and prevention of a disease or disorder causing the emergency,
and authorizing emergency use of unapproved products or approved products for
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unauthorized uses.354 Quarantine may also be used as ―necessary‖ to prevent the
introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases. 355 President Obama
used this Act to declare a Public Health Emergency for the H1N1 pandemic during
2009.356
In 2001, the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (―MSEHPA‖) was
drafted to address new health threats, such as SARS and influenza. 357 This important
piece of model legislation was intended to standardize and modernize state public
health legislation which would thereby enable state actors to take immediate action
in the event of a disaster.358 The MSEHPA established provisions for reporting
diseases and other health conditions. 359 It broadly defined the circumstances under
which a public health emergency may be declared or whether compulsory actions
may be undertaken, and permitted the same ―when the situation calls for prompt and
timely action.‖360 The MSEHPA also defined and established mechanisms for
enforcement of the states‘ compulsory powers through quarantine or isolation. 361 A
majority of states have enacted legislation based on the MSEHPA.362
On November 1, 2005, the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza was
released by then-President Bush to prepare the nation‘s response during an influenza
pandemic.363 The Strategy set forth distribution protocols for the limited availability
of vaccine and antiviral medication during the outbreak. 364 President Bush also
signed the National Security and Homeland Security Presidential Directive, which
created an ―Enduring Constitutional Government‖ in the case the federal government
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was drastically affected.365 This legislature established a ―cooperative effort‖ as a
matter of comity among the three branches of federal government, coordinated by
the President.366
Emergency legislation has also been passed to control communicable diseases, 367
such as preventing the interstate spread of diseases; 368 preventing the introduction,
spread or transmission of foreign diseases; 369 establishing the list of quarantinable
communicable diseases and penalties for violating quarantine regulations; 370
precluding aliens with communicable public health diseases from entry into the
U.S.;371 authorizing the cessation, cancelation or grounding of flights or restricting
airport airspace due to emergency conditions on the ground; 372 regulating or limiting
the interstate, instrastate or foreign transportation of, or providing for the inspection,
cleaning or destruction of, animals, food, and other property found to be
contaminated or infected;373 and, limiting the liability of those administering
emergency countermeasures or those volunteers participating in emergency aid.374
C. Current Application to Emergencies
There are five foundational functions of public health that must be generally
observed by the active Executive (or even state or local government) during a public
health crisis.375 The most important is preparedness through public health emergency
planning and exercises.376 The meticulously planned response to a disaster will
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safeguard the common good and restore the lost equilibrium. 377 Secondly,
surveillance requires the establishment of reasonable measures to not only detect, but
track emergencies that may arise or that have occurred. 378 This will aid in the
prevention or reduction of the traumatic effects of an emergency by immediately
addressing and directing public safety concerns.379 Third, is the management of
healthcare property by securing the availability of vaccines, pharmaceuticals and
hospitals to ensure that these measures do not become overwhelmed during the
crisis.380 Fourth, protection of persons by compelling, when clearly necessary,
vaccinations, testing, treatment, isolation, and quarantine will help reduce the spread
of contagion.381 Finally, communication with the public is paramount. Ensuring that
unambiguous and authoritative information reaches the public at large in a timely
manner will go a long way towards maintaining calm and public safety. 382
The appropriate division of these responsibilities during an emergency health
disaster is crucial to the successful response of local and state authorities. 383 Take for
instance the public health emergency scenario of a breakout of a virulent, contagious
disease. A decision is raised whether the Executive will need to order the medical
examination, vaccination, treatment or, worse case scenario, limited or widespread
quarantine of the populace.384 In these instances where the Executive action may be
tantamount to mandatory compulsion against civil liberties, an effective leader will
be able to preserve the public health and welfare better, faster, and more adequately
than an ineffective leader. ―Free people respond to leadership much more vigorously
than a people held in place by power, fear and terror of their own government.‖ 385
As was agreed by a group of attorneys, academics, and government officials,
―[c]lear, open, and lawful response by government officials is necessary for public
support and preservation of our national values. Rapid determination of the
appropriate balance between coercive government action and individual civil rights
is critical‖386 According to Professor Smith, ―public health ethics requires inherently
at-risk individuals to suffer elements of harm—through isolation, quarantine, or
compulsory vaccination—in order to advance the public good and secure the publicat-large from exposure to the spread of an infectious disease.‖387 Smith goes on to
state that:
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[b]ecause of the chaos a pandemic is likely to bring, a strategy that
focuses on benefiting society at large is a useful one, however, it must
also be ―guided by a spirit of humanism‖ and not eliminate autonomy
altogether in the process. . . . During a dire situation like a pandemic, with
thousands of citizens becoming stricken with a deadly influenza virus,
rationing health care and medical resources will not only be necessary,
but it will be just if applied correctly. 388
Timorous action can result in the spread of infectious disease and related deaths. 389
For instance, if an influenza pandemic occurred, sixty-two million people would
succumb and die nationally, and 89,000 to 207,000 people of the U.S. population
would die.390 To prevent losses of this magnitude, the Executive may be required to
approve the infringement of individual liberties in order to immediately safeguard
the lives of the many.391 This is a challenge that no one person should have to face.
V. CONCLUSION – THE PRINCIPLE OF NECESSITY AS A GLOSS ON EXECUTIVE POWERS
It is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is more compelling than
the security of the Nation.392

The authority for the President to act immediately in response to an emergency
arises out of the principle of necessity. 393 ―[A] military commander should be able to
use available resources to alleviate human suffering, without first requiring a
bureaucratic permission slip.‖394 As stated previously, necessity is a prerequisite for
presidential action.395 According to Thomas Jefferson, the laws of necessity or even
those of self-preservation, which necessitate the immediate action to preserve the
safety of our country when in danger, are of the highest obligation.
To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to written law, would be
to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are
enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means. . . .
The officer who is called to act on this superior ground, does indeed risk
himself on the justice of the controlling powers of the Constitution, and
his station makes it his duty to incur that risk. . . . The line of
discrimination between cases may be difficult; but the good officer is
388
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bound to draw it at his own peril, and throw himself on the justice of his
country and the rectitude of his motives. 396
Jefferson recognized the concept of necessity as a by-product of self-preservation.397
Without necessity, there is a heightened potential for the abuse of presidential
authority.398 Chief Justice Stone in Kahanamoku directed that ―[the] executive has
broad discretion in determining when the public emergency is such as to give rise to
the necessity.‖399 The determination that an emergency exists is a decision
exclusively resting with the President. 400
The Court expressed its rational fear that civil liberties may be laid by the
roadside in the expression of presidential authority in times of emergencies. 401 ―[A]n
executive, acting pursuant to statutory and constitutional authority may, consistent
with the Due Process Clause, unilaterally decide to detain an individual if the
executive deems this necessary for the public safety even if he is mistaken.‖402 A
historical record has shown, so long as the Executive proceeds under a a good faith
basis, his reasonable actions in limiting the rights of this individual will be
constitutionally upheld.403
Despite its reservations, the Court has dismissed any possibility of ―executive
tyranny‖404 in the existence of a showing of necessity. ―Any ambiguities in the
allocation of a power that is executive in nature . . . must be resolved in favor of the
executive branch.‖405 Any individual who acts on the principle of necessity in an
emergency scenario is presumed to act in the interest of the populace rather than in
furtherance of his own ambitions. 406 ―A rigorous adherent to the demands of
individual rights, however, will strike the balance with greater weight to the
language of rights than to the language of power.‖407 The Founders intended to
create a government that was ―cloathed [sic] with all the powers requisite to [the]
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complete execution of its trust.‖408 This trust is necessary for the security of the
nation.409
During the 1980s, the AIDS crisis became full blown. 410 Amidst heightened
fears, the prospect of quarantine returned to the national perspective. 411 Relatively
unknown at the time, AIDS was ―unlike any disease recently faced by man.‖ 412
Although AIDS is incurable and, at the time invariably fatal, victims could be
asymptomatic carriers for all of their lives.413 Indeed infected individuals posed no
hazard to those with whom they did not have sexual relations, share blood, or other
bodily fluid, or IV needles.414 In such a unique public health epidemic, where the
exact nature of the crisis is unknown or the results indeterminable, the Executive
must inevitably weigh the interest in protecting the public health against the
fundamental deprivation of civil liberties. 415
Chief Justice Rehnquist succinctly portrayed the struggle to uphold civil rights
alongside the Executive authority in his book ―All the Laws But One.‖ 416 According
to Chief Justice Rehnquist, ―[i]t is both desirable and likely that more careful
attention will be paid by the courts to the basis for the government's claims of
necessity as a basis for curtailing civil liberty. The laws will thus not be silent . . . but
they will speak with a somewhat different voice.‖ 417 History dictates that under
Executive discretion, ―the necessity for action in a manifest emergency will permit
exercise of granted powers in unusual ways that may threaten individual liberties.‖ 418
As this Article contends, it is clear that the President is inherently granted with
the powers to unilaterally act to protect and control the national security and interests
of the United States.419 Some powers may not be explicitly spelled out, and instead,
may be implicit.420 This is so because ―[o]f all the cares or concerns of government,
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the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the
exercise of power by a single hand.‖421 When necessary to preserve and protect the
safety and integrity of the United States and its responsibilities and obligations as a
sovereign nation, the President‘s powers are the broadest.422

inferences may be made from existing legislation determining the breadth of executive
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